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Abstract
Recent literature on tax evasion emphasizes the importance of moral
considerations to explain compliance behavior. As a consequence schol-
ars aim to identify factors that shape this so-called tax morale. However,
the causal link between tax morale and actual compliance behavior is
not established yet. Exploiting exogenous variation in tax morale –
given by the inherited part of tax morale of American-born from their
ancestors country of origin – our Two-Stage Least Square Estimation
provides ﬁrst evidence on a causal eﬀect of tax morale on the size of the
underground production.
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It is a well-known fact that neo-classical models of tax compliance underpredict
real-world compliance (Alm et al., 1992). Many scholars, therefore, concluded
that the explanation for the tendency to comply must be that individuals are
obeying a norm (Posner, 2000).1 Theoretical papers incorporated individuals
with an intrinsic motivation to comply (e.g. Gordon, 1989; Erard and Fein-
stein, 1994; Traxler, 2010). More recently, an increasing number of empirical
papers try to quantify the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (usually called tax
morale) with survey data.
Typically, these papers try to identify factors (both on an individual- or on
a more aggregated-level) that are correlated with a high level of tax morale.2
By now, a substantial amount of empirical evidence on the association between
tax morale and several socio-demographic characteristics from national and in-
ternational samples is available. Further, a number of papers study diﬀerent
institutional arrangements that are correlated with a high level of tax morale.
Clearly, this strand of literature presumes that tax morale aﬀects actual com-
pliance. But tax morale captured by survey data, does not measure individual
behavior but an individual attitude. A high tax morale does not necessarily
translate into a high level of tax compliance. However, the existence of such
a causal link determines the signiﬁcance of this literature. This causal link is
not established yet. In fact, relatively little empirical evidence (to be discussed
below) on the impact of tax morale on actual compliance behavior exists.
As a matter of fact it is extremely hard to identify this causal link. First,
one has to obtain and quantify both dimensions. In the case of tax compliance,
this is a non-trivial problem, since any form of non-compliance is diﬃcult to
observe. Naturally non-compliant tax payers will try to hide their deviant
behavior in order to avoid punishment. That means, tax evasion cannot be
observed and has to be estimated. Tax morale has to be obtained by adequate
survey techniques. Given that one can observe and link both dimensions, a
credible research design to establish a causal eﬀect is needed.
On an individual-level a number of papers use survey data to contrast self-
reported tax evasion with diﬀerent measurements of an intrinsic motivation to
comply with the tax code. One obvious critique of this research design is the
questionable accuracy of self-reported tax evasion information. In fact, Elﬀers
et al. (1987) show that the correlation between actual and self-reported tax
1Kleven et al. (2011) demonstrate that the ability to cheat (i.e. self-reporting versus
third-part reporting of income) is another important dimension of real world compliance,
which has been ignored in the standard model so far.
2For a survey of this literature, see, for instance, Torgler (2007).
2evasion is essentially zero.3 In order to solve this problem, scholars (e.g. Bosco
and Mittone, 1997; Torgler et al., 2007) combine tax evasion data obtained
in laboratory experiments with tax morale information from post-experiment
questionnaires. As usual, the shortcoming of these data is the artiﬁcial setting
in which it is generated. For instance, it is unclear whether individuals would
behave diﬀerently when they deal with real tax authorities instead of exper-
imenters. Even more importantly, the answers in the questionnaire may not
be independent from the behavior in the experiment. The correlation between
these two variables can be driven by reversed causality. Individuals may sim-
ple justify or conﬁrm their own self-interested behavior (Wenzel, 2005). Put
diﬀerently, in this case, actual behavior causally aﬀects tax morale, but not
vice versa.
On a more aggregate-level a number of papers present negative correla-
tions between the level of tax morale and the size of the shadow economy:
Weck (1983), Torgler (2005b) for Latin America, Alm and Torgler (2006) for
the U.S. and Europe, Alm et al. (2006) for several transition countries, and
Barone and Mocetti (2009) for Italy. This descriptive evidence allows several
interpretations and does not necessarily imply a causal eﬀect of tax morale on
the size of the shadow economy. A confounding factor, such as administra-
tive ineﬃciencies in the tax system, could be the driving force. There is also
concern for potential reversed causality; the size of the shadow economy may
aﬀect tax morale.
Most recently, Torgler and Schneider (2007, 2009); Torgler et al. (2007) ad-
dress this identiﬁcation problem and suggest instrumental variable approaches
to disentangle a causal eﬀect. Each paper has a diﬀerent focus and the sug-
gested instrumental variables vary.4 All papers use a Two-Stage Least Squares
estimation and ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of tax morale on
the size of the shadow economy. However, as discussed by Halla (2011), in
each case there are plausible arguments for the invalidity of the instruments.
3The authors managed to link tax audit data for approximately 700 Dutch taxpayers
with survey responses.
4Torgler and Schneider (2009) present a cross-sectional analysis of the eﬀect of tax morale
and institutional quality on the size of the shadow economy, where the authors try to
account for the endogeneity of tax morale and institutional quality with a set of instrumental
variables, such as legal origins of commercial laws. Torgler et al. (2007) include a panel data
analysis of the impact of tax morale on the size of the shadow economy, where weather
conditions (a measure for cloudiness) serves as an instrument. Torgler and Schneider (2007)
employ a panel data analysis to study the eﬀect of tax morale, institutional quality, and
governance on the size of the shadow economy. To instrument for tax morale a measure
of cloudiness and an index for moral values based on data from the European and World
Values Surveys is used.
3For instance, it is hard to rule out that the instrumental variable ‘weather
conditions’ does not have a direct eﬀect on the size of the shadow economy.
The construction industry, a sector which is diﬃcult to tax and known for
high underground activities, is aﬀected by weather conditions. In general,
bad weather slows down construction activity, and may also reduce the size of
the shadow economy. Moreover, the link between weather conditions and tax
morale (i.e. the ﬁrst stage) has no theoretical grounds and seems rather ad
hoc.
In this paper we also study the link between tax morale and the shadow
economy (or more precisely the underground production). To deal with po-
tential endogeneity problems we suggest to exploit exogenous variation in tax
morale given by the inherited part of tax morale. In particular, we follow an
approach inspired by Rice and Feldman (1997) and estimate the tax morale
inherited by the American-born from their ancestors country of origin. We
show that tax morale of second-generation Americans are mainly and signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuenced by the country of origin of their ancestors. This phenomenon
can be explained by a causal eﬀect of inherited moral values. We argue then
that this inherited part is not aﬀected by the current economic and institu-
tional environment. Consequently, we use the inherited part of tax morale as
an instrument for current tax morale in the home country.5
2 The link between tax morale and compliance
behavior
To measure tax morale we use data from the European and World Values Sur-
veys (WVS). In particular, we use responses to the following survey question:
‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can
always be justiﬁed, never be justiﬁed, or something in between: Cheating on
taxes if you have a chance’. Respondents are asked to evaluate this statement
on an ordered scale from ‘never justiﬁable’ (1) to ‘always justiﬁable’ (10). As
discussed by Halla (2011) this survey question is the best available source to
measure tax morale. Compared to other survey questions, its formulation is
quite general, and a reasonable number of respondents from a large set of
countries over time is available.
5A similar approach is used by Algan and Cahuc (2009) to study the eﬀect of civic virtue
on the design of unemployment beneﬁts and employer protection in member states of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). See, also Algan and
Cahuc (2010).
4To measure (non-)compliance behavior we suggest to use an estimate of the
so-called underground production. The OECD deﬁnes the underground pro-
duction as ‘[...] activities that may be both productive in an economic sense
and also quite legal (provided certain standards or regulations are complied
with) but deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following kinds
of reasons: (i) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; (ii) to
avoid the payment of social security contributions; (iii) to avoid having to meet
certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or
health standards, etc.; (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative pro-
cedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative
forms’ (OECD, 2002, page 37). The underground production, therefore, com-
prises important methods of tax evasion, such as under-reporting of income.
However, it excludes others that are non-productive, such as over-claiming de-
ductions. Further, it covers other non-compliant behavior such as fraudulent
receipt of unemployment beneﬁts or infringement of employment regulations.
While in principal it would be preferable to contrast tax morale with an
explicit estimate of tax evasion, this is not possible due to data limitations.
We are not aware of consistent estimates of tax evasion for a set for countries
over time. Whereas estimates of the underground production are available.
Our primary data source is Schneider et al. (2010). This World Bank report
provides estimates on the size of the underground production for a large set
of countries over the period from 1999 to 2007 based on a Multiple Indicators
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model.6
2.1 Descriptive evidence
In a ﬁrst step we use a very simple measure of tax morale and calculate
country-averages based on individual-level data from the WVS. We combine
all available country-years from the WVS from the years 1999 through 2004
with the estimated size of the underground production (UP) from Schneider
et al. (2010). This gives us a sample of 64 countries.7 In line with the existing
literature we ﬁnd a negative correlation between the level of tax morale and
the estimated size of the UP.
6For a comprehensive review of the available methods to estimate the size (of parts) of
the shadow economy, see, Schneider and Enste (2000). As any other method, the MIMIC
model is not without critique (see, e.g. Breusch, 2005; Dell’Anno and Schneider, 2006).
However, estimates based on this method have been successfully used in recent empirical
applications such as Johnson et al. (1998); Friedman et al. (2000).
7The average size of the UP as percentage of the oﬃcial GDP is in the 27 OECD member

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6The correlation coeﬃcient of minus 0:13 is quite small. However, the re-
lation increases considerably in an OLS regression framework. Speciﬁcation
OLS-I in Table1 controls for year ﬁxed eﬀects. The beta coeﬃcient is equal
to minus 0:274.8 That means, an increase in the level of tax morale by one
standard deviation (0:71 points) is associated with a decrease of the UP by
0:27 standard deviations. This is equivalent to an reduction of 3:6 percentage
points. This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 3:4 percent level. When we
in addition control for OECD membership (see OLS-II), we ﬁnd a somewhat
lower coeﬃcient. This simple estimation model explains about 45 percent of
the variation in the UP.
These OLS estimates suggest that tax morale may have a positive eﬀect on
compliance behavior. However, the estimated coeﬃcients are not very reliable,
since a correlation between tax morale and relevant unobserved factors (such
as the quality of institutions) has to be expected. One way to mitigate the
problem of unobserved heterogeneity is given by country ﬁxed eﬀects. In order
to obtain longitudinal information we amend our data set with information
from four other sources.9 This gives us an unbalanced panel data set covering
70 countries between the years 1989 and 2000.10 A cross-section analysis of
this bigger sample (see speciﬁcation OLS-III) shows again a strong correlation
between tax morale and the size of the UP. The beta coeﬃcient is equal to
minus 0:280. Notably, the size of the coeﬃcient did almost not change due to
the amendment of the UP data by diﬀerent sources. Speciﬁcation FE-I includes
country ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect of tax morale on the size of the UP persists.
After controlling for unobserved country-speciﬁc time-invariant heterogeneity,
the estimated eﬀect even increases in size and statistical signiﬁcance. We
obtain a beta coeﬃcient of minus 0:340.
However, before we can conclude that tax morale does reduce the size of
the UP, we have to evaluate the credibility of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. The
ﬁxed eﬀects model gives an unbiased estimate of the causal eﬀect of tax morale,
as long as it is not correlated with time-varying unobservables that aﬀects the
UP, and reversed causality can be ruled out. However, these assumptions
seem rather strong. For instance, both tax morale and compliance behavior
8In order to allow a comparison of the quantitative importance of tax morale across
diﬀerent speciﬁcations we report in all estimation tables beta coeﬃcients on tax morale in
squared brackets below the standard errors.
9Johnson et al. (1997) provides estimates for Central and Eastern European countries,
Loayza (1996) for South American countries, Bajada and Schneider (2005) for Asian coun-
tries, and Schneider (2005) for other OECD member states.
10For almost half of the countries at least two observations in time are available. Details
on the country-years included are provided in the notes to Table1.
7may be inﬂuenced by varying factors, such as quality of institutions. Or, as
argued above it is also plausible that compliance behavior has an impact on
individuals’ attitude. That means, individuals justify or conﬁrm their own
(self-interested) behavior. If one of these hypotheses holds, the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimate is inconsistent. In order to account for these potential endogeneity
problems, we suggest in the next section an instrumental variable approach.
This allows us to estimate the causal eﬀect of tax morale consistently and free
from asymptotic bias from unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
2.2 Evidence from an instrumental variable approach
Both tax morale, and the UP are clearly aﬀected by the current economic and
institutional environment of the country in which people live and pay taxes.
Our instrumental variable (IV) approach is based on the idea that tax morale,
as any other moral value or social norm, is in addition also partly inherited
over generations. This inherited part in tax morale should not be, or at least
not instantaneously, aﬀected by the economic and institutional environment.
Therefore, a quantiﬁcation of the inherited part in tax morale could serve as
an IV for current tax morale.
In order to obtain an estimate of the inherited part of tax morale (that is
not confounded by the current economic and institutional environment), we
use the inherited tax morale by American-born individuals from their ancestors
country of origin. In particular, we use responses to the following tax morale
question from the American General Social Survey (GSS): ‘Consider the sit-
uations listed below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does
not report all of his income in order to pay less income taxes’. The possible
answers categories are ‘not wrong’ (1), ‘a bit wrong’ (2), ‘wrong’ (3) and ‘se-
riously wrong’ (4). We create a binary variable equal to one if the respondent
answered ‘seriously wrong’ or ‘wrong’, and zero otherwise.11 We explain the














itc represents the tax morale of American-born respondent i in year
t whose ancestors came from country c. We control for basic socio-demographic
characteristics Xit (comprising information on sex, age, marital status and re-
ligious denomination) and the year of the survey t. The question on tax
morale was included in the GSS in the years 1991 and 1998. Our main vari-
ables of interest are the binary variables c representing the countries of origin
11The upper panel of Figure1 shows the distribution of the initial answer categories.






















not wrong a bit wrong wrong seriously wrong
A taxpayer does not report all of his income in order to pay less income taxes
 Do you feel it is ...
N=1,876  Mean=3.14  Standard deviation=0.74






















always 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 never
Cheating on taxes if you have the chance to [...] is justifiable?
N=34,752  Mean=8.52  Standard deviation=2.25
Tax morale in the World Values Survey
9Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the tax morale measurements
TMGSSa
TMWV Sd
Country c Nb Meanc Ne Meanf
Austria 18 0.80 1,475 0.86
Belgium 6 0.61 1,874 0.69
Canada 59 0.85 1,890 0.85
China 13 0.95 973 0.92
Czech Republic 31 0.86 1,867 0.88
Denmark 17 0.80 1,017 0.87
Finland 95 0.79 988 0.82
France 78 0.74 1,543 0.76
Germany 452 0.78 1,986 0.83
Greece 8 0.70 1,052 0.78
Hungary 20 0.88 971 0.85
Ireland 262 0.76 968 0.84
Italy 107 0.72 1,956 0.83
Japan 7 0.97 1,213 0.91
Mexico 76 0.80 1,440 0.84
Netherlands 39 0.92 996 0.81
Norway 44 0.80 1,118 0.81
Philippines 14 0.85 1,177 0.76
Poland 78 0.69 1,068 0.84
Portugal 7 0.52 974 0.81
Romania 4 0.88 1,080 0.77
Russia 34 0.79 2,372 0.78
Spain 25 0.74 1,162 0.84
Sweden 26 0.81 1,009 0.85
Switzerland 17 0.76 1,070 0.80
United Kingdom 339 0.82 937 0.83
72 0.79 1,314 0.82
a This measure of tax morale is based on individual responses to the following question
from the American General Social Survey of the years 1991 and 1998: ‘Consider the situ-
ations listed below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all
of his income in order to pay less income taxes’. The possible answers categories are ‘not
wrong ’ (1), ‘a bit wrong ’ (2), ‘wrong’ (3) and ‘seriously wrong’ (4). b Number of avail-
able observations per country of origin. c These ﬁgures give the share of American-born
respondents with ancestors from country c who answered ‘seriously wrong’ or ‘wrong’.
d This measure of tax morale is based on individual responses to the following question
from the European and World Values Surveys of the years 1999=2000: ‘Please tell me for
each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justiﬁed, never be
justiﬁed, or something in between: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance’. Respondents
are asked to evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from ‘never justiﬁable’ (1) to
‘always justiﬁable’ (10). For the following countries no survey data for the year 1999 or
2000 was available and we used information from the years in brackets: China (2001),
Norway (1996), Philippines (2001) and Switzerland (1996). e Number of available obser-
vations per home country. f These ﬁgures give the share of respondents from country c
who answered between (6) and (10).
10c of the American-born respondent i. We argue that these binary variables
capture the inherited part of tax morale transmitted from country of origin,
which is passed down through generations. The information on the country
of origin is based on the following question: ‘From what countries or part of
the world did your ancestors come?’.12 Our sample of 1;876 American-born
respondents comprises 26 diﬀerent countries of origin.13 As Table2 shows we
have on average 72 observations per country of origin available; the median is
equal to 29. The number of available respondents varies substantially across
countries of origin from only 4, as in the case of Romania, to 452 for Ger-
many. Nevertheless, we will see that all estimated country ﬁxed eﬀects are
highly statistically signiﬁcant. In Section2.2.1 we will show that excluding
the ﬁve countries (Belgium, Greece, Japan, Portugal and Romania) with the
least number of observations does not change our qualitative results.
To get comparable estimates of tax morale in home countries we create a
binary variable based on the tax morale question from the WVS (mainly from
the years 1999=2000).14 Table2 provides descriptive statistics. In line with
our classiﬁcation for the GSS, we divide the scale of possible answers in half.
Hence, we create a binary variable equal to one if the respondent answered
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itc stands for the tax morale of respondent i in year t from home
country c. Here, the variables of main interest are the binary variables c,
representing the home country c of respondent i. The rest of the estimation
model is equivalent to (1).
Table3 summarizes the estimation results from (1) and (2). Irrespective of
the tax morale variable used, we ﬁnd (as documented in the literature) that
being female, older, married, and belonging to any religious denomination is
related to a higher tax morale. The binary variables capturing the country of
origin and the home country are all highly statistically signiﬁcant.
12In the case respondents named more than one country, we selected the ﬁrst mentioned
country other than the USA.
13Broad categories such as ‘Africa’ or ‘Asia’ have been excluded. The remaining 26 coun-
tries restrict our sample for the subsequent analysis. Compared to the estimation analysis
in Table1 we have to exclude a number of countries, since there is no information available
to estimate the inherited part of tax morale.
14If in a country no survey has taken place in the year 1999 or 2000, we use data from
the year 2001 or 1996. Details are provided in the notes to Table2.
15The lower panel of Figure1 shows the distribution of the initial answer categories.
11Table 3: Tax morale by country of origin and by the home countrya
(I)b TMGSS (II)b TMWV S
Male -0.036*** (0.012) -0.034*** (0.004)
Age 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
Married 0.042** (0.016) 0.020*** (0.006)
Religiousc 0.082** (0.032) 0.021*** (0.006)
Year 1998 -0.002 (0.010)
c=c:
Austria 0.804*** (0.027) 0.855*** (0.012)
Belgium 0.609*** (0.024) 0.687*** (0.012)
Canada 0.855*** (0.023) 0.851*** (0.012)
China 0.952*** (0.024) 0.920*** (0.011)
Czech Republic 0.856*** (0.023) 0.877*** (0.012)
Denmark 0.801*** (0.025) 0.874*** (0.012)
Finland 0.790*** (0.025) 0.818*** (0.011)
France 0.745*** (0.024) 0.764*** (0.012)
Germany 0.780*** (0.023) 0.833*** (0.012)
Greece 0.703*** (0.020) 0.778*** (0.009)
Hungary 0.885*** (0.026) 0.853*** (0.012)
Ireland 0.757*** (0.022) 0.841*** (0.012)
Italy 0.715*** (0.022) 0.833*** (0.011)
Japan 0.969*** (0.019) 0.910*** (0.012)
Mexico 0.800*** (0.019) 0.840*** (0.009)
Netherlands 0.916*** (0.025) 0.811*** (0.012)
Norway 0.796*** (0.025) 0.809*** (0.011)
Philippines 0.853*** (0.019) 0.765*** (0.010)
Poland 0.689*** (0.021) 0.843*** (0.012)
Portugal 0.517*** (0.024) 0.805*** (0.012)
Romania 0.883*** (0.028) 0.767*** (0.012)
Russia 0.788*** (0.023) 0.779*** (0.012)
Spain 0.735*** (0.020) 0.839*** (0.011)
Sweden 0.805*** (0.026) 0.851*** (0.011)
Switzerland 0.758*** (0.023) 0.800*** (0.012)
United Kingdom 0.816*** (0.025) 0.833*** (0.011)
No. of obs./R-squared 1,876/0.86 34,176/0.89
a Method of estimation is ordinary least squares. The table shows estimated coeﬃcients with robust standard
errors (allowing for clustering by country and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in round parenthesis
below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent
level, respectively. b For a deﬁnition of the dependent variables TMGSS and TMWV S see the notes to






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13The country ﬁxed eﬀects associated with the home country c are in general
quantitatively more important than those of the country of origin c. However,
in the latter case the standard deviation of the coeﬃcients is twice as high as
in former case (sdc = 0:049, sdc = 0:099). Both facts indicate that living in
the USA has a homogenizing eﬀect on tax morale.
Most importantly, Figure2 shows the inherited part of tax morale, captured
by ^ c, is highly correlated with the tax morale in the home country ^ c. The
correlation coeﬃcient is equal to 0:58 and highly statistically signiﬁcant (p-
value= 0:002).16 This indicates that an intergenerational transmission of tax
morale (that persists across space) takes place.17 We now explore the eﬀect of
tax morale on the size of the UP based on a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS)
estimation. In particular, we estimate
UPc = 0 + 1  ^ ^ c + 2  Historical UPc + c; (3)
where UPc denotes the size of the UP of country c in the year 2000, and ^ ^ c is
derived from the ﬁrst stage regression of tax morale in the home country on
tax morale of Americans by their country of origin:
^ c = 0 + 1  ^ c + 2  Historical UPc + c: (4)
Our 2SLS estimation strategy is valid if ^ c is correlated with ^ c, but uncorre-
lated with any other unobserved determinant of UPc. The ﬁrst requirement
can be tested. It turns out that we have a very strong ﬁrst stage. The second
requirement, which can be stated as follows Cov(^ c;c) = 0, is not testable,
since c can not be observed.
A potential concern is that if the level of the UP is correlated over time, and
past levels of the UP aﬀected the tax morale of people who came to the USA,
and consequently still inﬂuence the tax morale passed on their descendants.
In order to fully solve this problem it would be ideal to control for the level of
the UP from the exact date before the ancestors left their home country. This
approach can not be perfectly implemented, since the date of migration is not
known and it varies across observations.
16If we use the original scaling of the tax morale variables a strong correlation pattern
between the two alternative measures still holds. The correlation coeﬃcient of 0:351 has a
p-value of 0:086.
17Note, Figure2 excludes Portugal. Portugal displays a very low inherited tax morale
(PT = 0:52) and appears to be an outlier. Including Portugal we would observe a correlation
coeﬃcient of 0:52 (p-value= 0:006). We exclude Portugal from our main analysis, since this
increases the strength of our ﬁrst stage. However, we will show in Section2.2.1 that including







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15However, we can use estimates on the size of the UP for all countries from
the late eighties, denoted by Historical UPc. This gives a lag of more than
a decade compared to our outcome variable from the year 2000.18 We are
conﬁdent that after controlling for the historical level of UP in country c, the
inherited part of tax morale aﬀects the size of the current UP only through
the channel of current tax morale.
Table4 shows two diﬀerent speciﬁcations with varying control variables. In
each case the ﬁrst stage shows a highly statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
of inherited tax morale and tax morale in the home country. The F-statistic
on the excluded instrument is in each case well above ten – the critical value
suggest by Stock et al. (2002). We conclude that our instrument is suﬃciently
strong.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the second stage show the expected signs and
are reasonable in size. Considering speciﬁcation 2SLS-I, we see that the UP
is estimated to be about 6:4 percentage points lower among OECD member
states. The sample average is 21:30 percent of the GDP. The historical level
of UP is a strong predictor for the size of the UP in the year 2000. Most
importantly, we ﬁnd that a higher tax morale decreases the size of the UP.
The estimated coeﬃcient – given by the ratios of the reduced form and the
ﬁrst stage eﬀect of TMGSS – is about minus 56:80 and statistically signiﬁcant
at a 5:1 percent level.19 The beta coeﬃcient of minus 0:293 suggests that
an increase in tax morale by one standard deviation (equal to 0:05 points)
decreases the size of the UP by 0:293 standard deviations or 2:84 percentage
points. This eﬀect is somewhat lower compared to the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
To get a better idea of the quantitative importance of tax morale we consider
an increase of tax morale in Belgium. Belgium has the lowest tax morale in
our sample ( ^ BE = 0:69) and an estimated UP of 22:2 percent of GDP. If tax
morale would increase to the sample average of  c = 0:83 the UP is estimated
to decrease to 14:33 percent.
2.2.1 Sensitivity analysis
It is a priori not clear which covariates we should include in our analysis.
More control variables are not necessary better. Control variables which are
themselves outcome variables (i.e. factors that are determined by tax morale)
18The estimates are based on the sources cited in footnote 9. Best to our knowledge, no
consistent estimates on the size of UP for a large sample of countries are available before
1989.
19We will provide evidence below that this eﬀect is very robust, and its signiﬁcance gen-
erally increases if more covariates are included.
16should not be included in the 2SLS estimation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009,
Chapter 3). Papers studying the determinants of the UP usually control for
the oﬃcial GDP (e.g. Johnson et al., 1997). In fact, GDP is a problematic
covariate in our case, since it may be aﬀected by tax morale. However, in
any case, the speciﬁcation 2SLS-II in Table4 shows that including GDP has
almost no impact on the estimated size of the UP.
The most important dimension determining the size of the UP put forward
by the literature is governance.20 Scholars emphasize the signiﬁcance of low
regulatory ‘burden’, less corruption, and a better rule of law. To check the
robustness of our results, we control for the key dimensions of governance:
(i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability and absence of violence,
(iii) government eﬀectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law, and (vi)
control of corruption. The data is from the the Worldwide Governance In-
dicators Project provided by the World Bank. These six measures are based
on the views of thousands of stakeholders worldwide, including respondents
to household and ﬁrm surveys, and experts from nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and public sector agencies.21 In each case a higher scores indicates a
better environment. Since the correlation among the diﬀerent measurements
is very high, we include in Table5 one variable in turn. All measurements of
the quality of governance (except voice and accountability) are highly statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and enter with a negative sign. Therefore, we can support the
hypothesis that better governance is associated with a lower UP. Most impor-
tantly, we observe that the signiﬁcant eﬀect of tax morale persists. Compared
to the baseline speciﬁcations in Table4, the estimated eﬀects even increased
in size and in statistical signiﬁcance. We also used diﬀerent measurements
of governance provided by the The Heritage Foundation. Based on the Her-
itage Foundation’ Economic Freedom Index (and all its subcomponent) we
obtain equivalent results. Detailed estimation output is available in the Web
Appendix.
In Table6 we check the sensitivity of our result with respect to the sam-
ple chosen. As mentioned above, Portugal appears to be an outlier (with
respect to the size of the inherited tax morale) that reduces the strength of
our ﬁrst stage. Speciﬁcation R2-II shows that the F-statistic on the excluded
instrument decreases to 10:18; compared to the baseline speciﬁcation with an
F-statistic of 14:47 (see speciﬁcation R2-I). Nevertheless, including Portugal
does not change the qualitative result in the second stage regression.
20See, for instance, Johnson et al. (1997, 1998); Friedman et al. (2000); Dabla-Norris et al.
(2008).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 6: Sensitivity analysis with respect to samplea
(R2-I) (R2-II) (R2-III) (R2-IV)
Full Including Excluding Reduced
sample Portugal Belgium sample
Tax moraleb -56.799* -62.205* -110.540** -168.615*
(29.057) (33.207) (51.856) (100.159)
[-0.293] [-0.327] [-0.469] [-0.637]
Historical UPc 0.833*** 0.819*** 0.750*** 0.690***
(0.151) (0.160) (0.188) (0.266)
OECD member stated -6.412** -6.386** -5.256* -6.312
(2.545) (2.563) (2.946) (4.391)
Constant 60.405** 65.115** 105.769** 156.028*
(25.755) (29.390) (44.947) (86.734)
No. of observations 25 26 24 21
Mean of UP 21.30 21.35 21.26 20.76
Standard deviation of UP 9.69 9.50 9.90 9.80
Mean of TMWV S 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83
Standard deviation of TMWV S 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
F-statistic on the excl. instr. 14.47 10.18 6.93 3.22
a The dependent variable is equal to the estimated size of the underground production (UP) as percentage
of the oﬃcial GDP of country c in the year 2000 from Schneider et al. (2010), where in the full sample
c = fAustria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdomg. The reduced sample excludes Belgium, Greece, Japan, and Ro-
mania. Method of estimation is 2SLS. The table shows estimated coeﬃcients with standard error in round
parenthesis below. In squared brackets beta coeﬃcients are reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. b This variable is a measure
of tax morale in country c in the year t =2 f1996;1999;2000;2001g, given by the estimated coeﬃcients ^ c
from (2); see Table3. This variable is instrumented by a measure of the inherited part of tax morale of
American-born individuals from their ancestors country of origin c, given by the estimated coeﬃcients ^ c
from (1); see Table3. c This variable is equal to the estimated size of the UP as percentage of the oﬃcial
GDP of country c in the year 1989=90. Sources are given in footnote 9. d This binary variable is equal to
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20We observe an estimated beta coeﬃcient of tax morale equal to minus 0:327,
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 6:1 percent level. Similarly, speciﬁcation
R2-III shows that excluding Belgium (a further potential outlier, see Figure2)
increases the signiﬁcance of the estimated impact of tax morale.
Finally, the low number of respondents from certain home countries in the
GSS might be a concern. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results
and exclude the ﬁve home countries (Belgium, Greece, Japan, Portugal and
Romania) with the least number of observations, see speciﬁcation R2-IV. This
increases the average number of respondents per home country from 72 to
88. Notably, the lower panel in Table6 shows that the variables of primary
interest have almost identical means in the full and in this reduced sample.
Based on the reduced sample we observe again a negative impact of tax morale.
Both, the estimated (beta) coeﬃcient and the standard errors increase in size,
however, the eﬀect is in this small sample still statistically signiﬁcant at the
9:2 percent level. We also replicated the analysis controlling for the quality
of governance for our reduced sample, see Table7. Again, our results are
robust to this sample modiﬁcation and compared to the baseline speciﬁcation
in Table6 we observe an increased statistical signiﬁcance.
3 Conclusions
The causal link between tax morale and actual compliance behavior has not
been established yet. To this extent, it was unclear why economic scholars
should be interested in (the determinants of) tax morale? In this paper we
provide ﬁrst evidence that tax morale causally aﬀects compliance behavior.
Exploiting exogenous variation in tax morale – given by the inherited part of
tax morale of American-born from their ancestors country of origin – our 2SLS
estimation shows that a higher tax morale reduces the size of the underground
production. This evidence increases particularly the signiﬁcance of the strand
of literature studying tax morale. It shows that tax morale can indeed help
to explain the puzzle why people pay taxes, despite the existence of low audit
probabilities and penalty rates. More generally, this result conﬁrms the suppo-
sition that both economic incentives and social norms (or moral consideration)
drive individual behavior.
An important caveat about this empirical evidence, however must be men-
tioned: given that our empirical analysis based on a quite small sample, the
magnitudes of the estimated eﬀects should be interpreted with some caution.
In general, it would be desirable to verify the eﬀect of tax morale on compliance
behavior in better data if any opportunity arises.
21Still, our result has also important implications for public policy. It shows
that policy makers can in principle alter tax evasion by manipulating tax
morale. Naturally, this conclusion raises the important question about good
instruments for policy reforms. The literature discusses several institutional
arrangements, such as direct democracy (Alm et al., 1999; Feld and Tyran,
2002; Torgler, 2005a), that are correlated with a high level of tax morale. Feld
and Frey (2002) stress the importance of a respectful treatment of taxpayers
by tax authorities. These are important ﬁndings, and scholars should pursue
along these lines to uncover causal relationships. However, our 2SLS approach
reveals that policy reforms intended to increase tax morale may not be very
eﬀective in the short-run. Tax morale is persistent, to a large degree it is
inherited over generations, and it might take some time to change it.22 This
notion is in line with the evidence from natural tax experiments presented in
Blumenthal et al. (2001); Fellner et al. (forthcoming) who both ﬁnd no eﬀect
of normative appeals or moral suasion on compliance behavior.
22See Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) for an elaborate discussion of parents’ incentives for
instilling norms in their children.
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